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The Relationship Between Section 8(e) Cases and
Antitrust Cases
Harold J. Datz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a truism to say that the field of labor law does not stand
unto itself. A given controversy between labor and management
may involve fields of law beyond the narrow parameters of labor
law. When this occurs, there is a problem concerning which tribunal is to decide the issues of law. Thus, for example, where the
controversy involves issues under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 1 issues under the Sherman Act,2 and issues of con-

tract law, who is to decide the disputes: the NLRB, federal agencies and courts charged with responsibility for anti-trust enforcement, or arbitrators and courts charged with contract
enforcement?
I would like to focus on one aspect of this problem that touches
my agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Where
the controversy involves NLRA issues and other issues, to what
extent do tribunals with jurisdiction over the controversy have jurisdiction over the NLRA issues, i.e. to what extent does the
NLRB lose its exclusive jurisdiction over NLRA issues?
II.

POWER OF A COURT TO RESOLVE

NLRA ISSUES

ANTITRUST CASES OR IN SECTION

301

ARISING IN

CASES

In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
100,' decided in 1975, the Supreme Court dealt with a case
presenting issues under section 8(e) of the NLRA and sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act. The contractual clause under attack
required the signatory employer to restrict its subcontracting to
* Mr. Datz is an Associate General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, NLRB.
However, his spoken and written remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the National Labor Relations Board or its General Counsel.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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firms who had contracts with the signatory union. Under union
pressure, Connell signed the clause. It thereafter attacked the
clause as being violative of the Sherman Act. The union defended
on the ground that the clause was protected by the construction
industry proviso to section 8(e).
At the outset, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the
section 8(e) question was within the exclusive province of the
NLRB. The Court held that it was not. In rather sweeping terms,
the Court stated that "federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under inde''4
pendent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that, according to the Court,
the NLRB had never passed on the section 8(e) proviso issue
presented in that case. Thus, the Court did not have to decide the
issue of what deference, if any, it would pay to Board resolution of
the issue.
Thus, as noted, the Court held that it had the power to resolve
the 8(e) issue. It resolved that issue by holding that the clause was
not protected by the 8(e) proviso. On a related question, the union
argued that even if the clause was unlawful under section 8(e), the
exclusive remedy therefore was under the NLRA and not under
antitrust law. The Court rejected this argument. "There is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that labor-law remedies for § 8(e) violations were intended to be exclusive, or that
Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the
NLRA."5
The same issue was presented to the Court in the recent case
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins. In that case, Kaiser had a contract
with the UMW under which it was obligated to make contributions
to certain health and retirement funds. The contributions would be
measured by the amount of coal produced by the unit employees
and the number of hours they worked. In addition, the signer had
to make an additional payment for each ton of purchased coal for
which a contribution had not been made. Thus, if the signatory
bought coal from a non-UMW producer, it had to make an additional payment.
Kaiser produced only high-volatile coal, and it therefore had to
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 634.
102 S. Ct. 851 (1982).
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purchase mid-volatile coal. It purchased such coal from Mid-Continent. That employer's employees were represented by another
union, but they enjoyed benefits equal to or better than the UMW
contract. However, since Mid-Continent was not a UMW signatory, and did not pay into UMW funds, Kaiser was required to
make the additional contributions for this purchased coal. Kaiser
paid the contributions based on the coal that it produced and on
the hours worked by its employees. But it declined to make contributions based on the coal produced by Mid-Continent. After expiration of the contract, the trustees sued Kaiser under section 301.
Kaiser defended on the ground that the "purchased coal" clause
violated the Sherman Act and violated section 8(e) of the NLRA.
With particular respect to the latter contention, Kaiser argued that
the clause penalized Kaiser for doing business with a non-UMW
firm, and that the purpose of the clause was to acquire representative status for the UMW regarding Mid-Continent's employees.
Accordingly, Kaiser was enmeshed in the UMW's dispute with
Mid-Continent.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
that Kaiser could not defend against the section 301 suit by claiming that the clause violated antitrust laws or violated section 8(e).
Regarding the section 8(e) defense, the court ruled that section
8(e) was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Supreme Court disagreed. Regarding the 8(e) issue, the Court declined to leave this matter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB.
In deciding Kaiser as it did, the Court effectively extended Connell. It will be recalled that, in Connell, the defendant-union argued that the clause was privileged under the NLRA and, therefore, an antitrust violation could not be established. In the Kaiser
case, the defendant-employer argued that the contract was unlawful under the NLRA and, therefore, contractual liability should
not attach. However, this distinction was rejected. In both cases,
the section 8(e) issue had to be resolved to adjudicate the plaintiff's claim, whether that claim be under the Sherman Act or under
section 301.
The Court also went beyond Connell in the sense that the Kaiser case was a contract enforcement action. Where one party has
performed under a contract, and the other party has not, it is arguably a forfeiture to sanction non-performance by the other
party. Thus, in the Kaiser case, the employees had performed services for their employer, and the employer was withholding a por-
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tion of the compensation. It was argued that to permit Kaiser to
escape payment was to give it a windfall and to work a forfeiture.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the Court declined to enforce the contract. The Court said that "our cases leave no doubt
that illegal promises will not be enforced in cases controlled by the
federal law." The Court also said:
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements
is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the
public policy of the United States as manifested in .

.

. federal statutes

....
Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of
that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of
judicial power.'

The Court also noted that section 8(e) provides that hot cargo
clauses are an unfair labor practice and are "unenforceable and
void." Thus, in that one sentence, Congress declared that the
NLRB could find and remedy an unfair labor practice, and a section 301 court could refrain from enforcing a contract. The Court
concluded as follows:
[W]here a § 8(e) defense is raised by a party which § 8(e) was designed to
protect, and where the defense is not directed to a collateral matter but to
the portion of the contract for which enforcement is sought, a court must
entertain the defense. While only the Board may provide affirmative remedies for unfair labor practices, a court may not enforce a contract provision
which violates § 8(e). Were the rule otherwise, parties could be compelled to
comply with contract clauses, the lawfulness of which would be insulated
from review by any court.8

I would note parenthetically that one can legitimately quarrel
with the notion that Kaiser is a party which Section 8(e) is
designed to protect. In the first place, Kaiser was a signatory to the
8(e) clause and was, in law, in pari delicto with the union signatory. However, it is clear that section 8(e) is designed to protect
public rights, 'and not private ones. Thus, there is a public interest
in the nonenforcement of the contract, even though this works to
the private benefit of a wrong-doer. Secondly, Kaiser was a neutral
in a section 8(e)-8(b)(4)(B) sense. Section 8(b)(4)(B) would prohibit a union from pressuring Kaiser to cause it to cease doing business with the union's primary disputant, the non-UMW coal company. Section 8(e) is aimed at preventing the union from
accomplishing the same end by agreement. Thus, section 8(e)
7.
8.

Id. at 859 (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)).
102 S. Ct. at 860.
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would prohibit the union from agreeing with Kaiser to cease doing
business with the union's primary disputant, the non-UMW coal
company. In both situations, the non-UMW company is the primary and Kaiser is the neutral, and (8)(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) are
designed to protect neutrals.
Perhaps though, this is where 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) part company.
That is, section 8(b)(4)(B) is designed to protect Kaiser from pressure. Further, under section 8(b)(4)(A), Kaiser can stop pressure to
force it to sign a section 8(e) clause. But once it signs the clause,
section 8(e) may be used to prohibit enforcement and thereby protect the boycotted employer, the non-UMW producer. Thus, it
may be that section 8(e) is designed to protect the victim of the
enforcement of a section 8(e) clause. Notwithstanding this, the
Court said that Kaiser was a party which section 8(e) was designed
to protect.
Finally, the Court permitted Kaiser to raise the defense, even
though the union's suit was based on a claim for contributions to a
health and retirement fund, and Congress had amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)9 to remove road blocks from the perfecting of such claims. The Court
concluded that the relevant section of ERISA, section 306(a), did
not operate to preclude Kaiser's defense. That section provides:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively
bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make
such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan
or agreement."0

The Court reasoned that if the clause is violative of section 8(e),
it is "inconsistent with law" and therefore section 8(e) could be
raised as a defense to the contract action. Section 306(a) precludes
only unrelated or extraneous defenses.
Thus, a court with section 301 or antitrust jurisdiction can hear
and decide whether an agreement violates 8(e). A different issue is
whether such a court can hear and decide the issue of whether a
given clause is a mandatory or non-mandatory subject of bargaining. It is clear that a clause can be non-mandatory without being
unlawful. It is also clear that the issue of whether a clause is
mandatory is relevant to the issue of antitrust liability. That is,
whether a clause is mandatory is a factor that may operate to
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 100la-1453 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. Id. at § 1145 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
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render it immune from antitrust attack. The question is if a court
that has an antitrust case before it would decide the issue of
whether the clause is mandatory, just as it decides 8(e) issues. The
Court's language in Connell is broad enough to permit a court to
do so. Thus, the Court said that "federal courts may decide labor
law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought
under independent federal remedies . . . ."" On the other hand,
the issue of whether a clause is mandatory may be better addressed by the Board. It involves the scope of section 8(d) of the
NLRA in light of changing industrial realities, rather than a construction of a specific legislative prohibition. Thus, there is an argument for leaving this issue to the Board. (The issue could be
raised in either a Section 8(b)(3) or 8(a)(5) case.) However, I suspect that a court would decide the issue. The Court's language in
Connell is broad enough to support this result. Further, United
Mine Workers v. Pennington"' involved a non-mandatory clause.
That is, the clause was related to the wages paid by other employers in other units. The Court held that the agreement was not immune from antitrust attack.
Still another issue is whether a court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide an antitrust case would stay its hand because the case
involved section 8(a)(3) issues. The problem may be presented in
the California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General
Contractors of California'scase. In essence, that case involves an
alleged agreement among employers to do business with non-union
subcontractors and to refrain from doing business with union subcontractors. It should be noted at the outset that, unlike Connell,
it would appear that an antitrust violation in this case is not dependent upon a showing of a violation of the NLRA. Secondly, the
issue of whether the NLRA offers exclusive remedies may turn on
the facts of a particular case. Under one set of facts, the NLRA
may offer no remedy, and a fortiori, the NLRA would not offer an
exclusive remedy. Thus, if a subcontractor remains unionized and
loses business as a consequence of the agreement, there may be no
violation of the NLRA. The NLRB has held that the NLRA does
not forbid one employer from refraining to do business with another, even if this action is prompted by the fact that the second
employer is a unionized firm.1 4 Thus, even if employees, the union,
11.
12.
13.
14.

421
381
648
See

U.S. 616, 626 (1975) (emphasis added).
U.S. 657 (1965).
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir.
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and the subcontractor can show an injury, it may nonetheless be
the case that the NLRA offers no relief.
On the other hand, if the subcontractors, in order to be eligible
bidders, withdrew recognition from the union and/or discharged
their union adherent employees, this conduct would constitute a
violation of the NLRA by the subcontractors. Further, it may be
that the firms who caused this may be liable along with the subcontractor. However, under Connell, it would appear that the mere
fact that these NLRA remedies would be available for the union
and the employees would not, by itself, operate to defeat an antitrust claim by the union and/or the employees.
III.

CHOICE OF REMEDIES

We have seen that a court with jurisdiction to hear and decide a
section 301 case or an antitrust case can hear and decide section
8(e) issues. Thus, as a practical matter, an employer-signatory to a
section 8(e) clause has a number of options available to it. For example, it can decline to enforce the clause, and file a section 8(e)
charge with the Board. If merit is found to the charge, a complaint
would issue and 10(1) relief would be sought to restrain enforcement of the clause. In the alternative, it can decline to honor the
clause and raise a section 8(e) defense to a section 301 suit.
It should be noted in passing that, in a sense, the route of filing
a charge offers certain advantages. The enforcement of the clause
can be immediately enjoined pendente lite upon a showing of "reasonable cause to believe" that section 8(e) has been violated. By
contrast, the defense of a section 301 case involves the process of
establishing the 8(e) violation. Of course, proceeding before the
Board is not without its risks. The Board may decline to find the
8(e) violation. If it so finds, the charging party-signatory may be
estopped from raising the matter in a section 301 case. At the very
least, the section 301 court would probably give some deference to
the Board's opinion.
Assuming that the signatory employer carries out the 8(e) clause,
the boycotted employer has a choice of remedies. For example, in
the case of an unlawful subcontracting clause, the signatory employer stops doing business with a non-union subcontractor. In
that event, the subcontractor can file a section 8(e) charge and the
Board could seek a 10(1) order restraining compliance with the
clause. In addition, the subcontractor could file an antitrust claim
1972); Local 447 and Malbaff Landscape Const. 172 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 128 (1968).
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seeking the same relief, plus damages.
The choice of filing a charge offers the opportunity for an injunction based on a showing of "reasonable cause to believe" that section 8(e) has been violated. However, as discussed supra, the
charging party runs the risk of a loss before the NLRB and collateral estoppel in the antitrust case. Further, under current Board
law, the section 8(e) case will not result in the award of money
damages to the charging party.

IV.

DEFERENCE TO

NLRB

DETERMINATIONS

Assuming that a charge is filed, what deference, if any, will the
court give to the NLRB disposition?
The disposition can be at various stages. The General Counsel
can administratively dismiss the charges. In Connell, the Court
dealt with a General Counsel dismissal, but said that it was distinguishable. In Kaiser the General Counsel had dismissed a charge
filed by another party attacking the same clause. However, the
Court was not called upon to resolve the section 301 case on the
merits, and thus did not have to deal with the deference issue. In
my view, the Court would give some deference to a well reasoned
General Counsel dismissal, but not as much to a full Board
decision.
In cases where the General Counsel proceeds, there will be multiple proceedings involving some of the same issues. In National
Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corporation,15 a district
court judge, acting under section 301, had granted injunctive relief
to enforce a contract clause. Subsequently, the NLRB Regional Director sought to enjoin enforcement of the clause in a 10(1)-8(e)
proceeding. A different judge in the same district court denied the
relief. On a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted the 10(1) relief and reversed the section 301
injunction. The case illustrates that the route of consolidated appeal can avoid inconsistent results at this stage. The case also
shows that, because of the relatively insubstantial burden in 10(1)
cases, the 8(e) contention is likely to prevail at this stage.
After this stage, the Board would ultimately rule on the merits.
It would appear that its ruling would be reviewed by a court of
appeals under normal standards. If the court found a section 8(e)
violation, it would not enforce the contract, and it may find an antitrust violation. If the court found the contrary, it would enforce
15.

457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972).

1983

NLRB Jurisdiction

427

the contract, and probably not find an antitrust violation.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the result of recent decisions, it is clear that courts with jurisdiction over antitrust and section 301 claims have the power to resolve NLRA issues. The result is that parties pursue remedies and
claims, based on NLRA principles, in non-Board forums. The
choice of forum becomes a part of a litigant's strategy, and it can
be anticipated that different parties will pursue different avenues
in future cases. In these circumstances, it is essential that each tribunal give due regard to the aims of all federal policies - the
NLRA, antitrust legislation, and section 301 contract principles.

